Can Corporate Taxation Be Explained By Limited Liability?

dc.contributor.advisor	Miglo, Anton	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Miglo, Anton	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2014-07-16T16:12:15Z
dc.date.available	2014-07-16T16:12:15Z
dc.date.issued	2008-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Miglo, A. (2008, December 01). Can Corporate Taxation Be Explained By Limited Liability? Journal of Current Issues in Finance, Business and Economics, 2(4), 1-6.
dc.identifier.other	43bfc03d-3346-0419-f121-aef20b3d7f21	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://scholarworks.bridgeport.edu/xmlui/handle/123456789/368
dc.description	We consider a model where wealth-constrained entrepreneurs have private information about the qualities of available investment projects.We show that some "high risk-high return" projects will receive external financing even if they are not socially profitable.Some "low risk-low return" projects will not be funded even if they are socially profitable.Government interventions can improve equilibrium. Optimal government policy may include corporate taxation,subsidies or other instruments.A universal tax on all entrepreneurs with limited liability is not optimal.	en_US
dc.publisher	Nova Science Publisher	en_US
dc.subject	Accounting	en_US
dc.subject	Business entity taxation	en_US
dc.subject	Taxation	en_US
dc.title	Can Corporate Taxation Be Explained By Limited Liability?	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
dc.publication.issue	4	en_US
dc.publication.name	Journal of Current Issues in Finance, Business and Economics	en_US
dc.publication.volume	2	en_US