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This article suggests that despite consistent support for the rhetoric of noninterference China’s implementation of the policy has become varied and contextualized in reaction to Africa’s increasingly diversified political and economic landscape since the early 2000s. As Sino-African linkages have deepened, they have created economic winners and losers within African states, creating “anti-China” special interests. Countries with competitive economic relations (high export similarity) have seen concentrations of anti-China sentiment among negatively impacted populations. Manifestations of anti-China sentiment have varied across regimes: ranging from organized violence against Chinese firms and nationals by insurgent groups in Sudan and Ethiopia to the adoption of anti-Chinese campaign slogans in Zambia. In addressing backlashes against growing engagement and maintaining relatively high public approval, Beijing has modified its approach of noninterference in African relations: Single-party engagement in consolidated autocracies, e.g. Sudan and Ethiopia. Multiparty engagement in consolidated democracies, e.g. Ghana. Flexible engagement in transitional regimes, e.g. Zambia and Nigeria. |
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