Interview with Leland Miles, 10 Oct., 1986

This is Friday the 10th of October, 1986 and I'm talking with Dr. Leland Miles, the president of the University, but by pre-agreement, we are covering the period when he was Dean of the College of Arts and Science at the University of Bridgeport. Now, the first question, Lee, is why did you come to UB?

Lee: Well, there were at least three reasons, Bill. One was, and I was in the situation of putting up or shutting up. I had been critical of administrators and deans for some time, and now the chance came to be one and it was a case of either doing it or forever keeping my peace. So that was, truthfully, one of the reasons. I remember, at the time, that I had the opportunity from UB, I also had an offer to go to the State University of New York at Binghamton, the Harpur College, which is a liberal arts college, on six hours teaching load for two semesters and every third semester off for research and writing. In looking back on it, I think I made a terrible mistake. It was really a case of choosing between that kind of a life, and the type of life I had been criticizing, and finally I decided to put up rather than shut up. 

I think also that as one is in the academic life, one begins to yearn for the power to change things, and those of us who have that feeling as faculty, think that if we can ever get into a position of alleged authority, that we would be able to make changes, and of course, once you get there you discover it's a lot more difficult than you realized, but the opportunity to possibly to make some curricular changes that I felt were important in liberal education was another factor.

I guess the third factor was the potential of UB itself, that I have always felt the university had enormous potential; its location is phenomenal for its type of university. If you had to ask where could you best put a private university, in terms of fund raising, there's no place better than Fairfield County, which is the wealthiest county probably per capita in the United States with all the wealthy corporations, and in fact, in terms of drawing talent to the university for adjunct faculty and the like, it is difficult again to imagine a more talented locale.

So for all those reasons, I think, the offer from Dr. Littlefield was a tempting one. I remember vividly that he came to Cambridge. I was a fellow at Harvard at the time, on leave from the University of Cincinnati, and I can still see in my mind's eye, us sitting in the living room of that townhouse, talking about the possibility. I remember one question he asked me was, would I be interested in being Chairman of the English Department, and I said no, if I was going to do that I had an of-
fer from Southern Methodist, which was true, and I wasn't going to settle for that at UB, so I think even at that point he might have been a little nervous about -

Allen: We were looking for a chairman for the English Department at that time and Henry was trying to get you for less money.

Lee: I'm sure that was the case.

Allen: He did interview you in December when he was up for the New England Association meeting.

Lee: That's true, and I remember too, he invited me to the Hilton Hotel, I think, where he was staying, after talking with me at the townhouse. We lived in a townhouse in Boston and I remember, among other things, he showed me his appointment book which was absolutely black with notations and appointments, and wanted to know whether I wanted to lead that type of life, and I really thought that was a big bluff, that no appointment book could really have that many appointments.

Allen: He was doing a lot of interviewing at that time.

Lee: Probably so. I remember in retrospect that, you know almost better than anybody, what my calendar looks like and it turns out that that appointment book was pretty good reflection of the lifestyle that became mine.

Allen: You will recall that we had been looking for a dean for some time to replace Dr. Ropp who had been extended, and some of the candidates which they had here previously bombed. You didn't know that?

Lee: No.

Allen: They had one candidate from Duke. Had a PhD in Moral Philosophy, and when he was being interviewed by the faculty, a note came around and told us what his dissertation was on, and it was some moralist in the 17th century. Now this is my field in England. In my field, I didn't know that, so I went to the Dictionary of National Biography and looked it up and found that this fellow had been accused of plagiarism. So here was an interesting opening gambit to get the guy to expand upon what he'd been doing.

Lee: You mean the figure he was writing on was accused of plagiarism?

Allen: Yes. Now this took me just a few minutes to find in the DNB, so we got to the interview and I said, I noticed your dissertation was on such and such, and now he was accused of plagiarism, how did you treat that charge in regards to Moral
Philosophy? He said, what charge of plagiarism? He didn't know it! Well, Henry was there and his face got purple and he bombed. This is one reason why he never let me in on another interview.

Lee: I'm glad you weren't in on my interview. I remember in my interview, several professors asked a very difficult question. One was Francis Dolan who wanted to know what size, what number of students could you accommodate in a Biology Lab. Of course I had no idea at the time, and I said I would have to take the word of the Biology Chairman for that and he beamed. And then a professor named Roucek pointed out that Yale had just established an endowed chair in Jewish Philosophy, I think, no, I guess it was Catholic Philosophy, and wanted to know what I would do about that, and I said, well, I guess we would have to have one in Jewish Philosophy too, the Jewish religion, and he liked that, but I hadn't known that there were problems involved, but I presumed they had been ruled out for some reason.

Allen: O.K. let's move on to the next question. What was your charge upon becoming Dean of A & S?

Lee: Well, I don't really recollect that had been given any charge by the president, but I know what self appointed mission I established for myself and announced. I'm not saying, incidentally that I wasn't given a charge, in fact I had meant to say at the beginning of this session, that the memory is a very tricky business, and some of my comments might not be factually accurate unintentionally, but I don't recall that he had given me any charge. My own self appointed mission was to try to make the College of Arts and Sciences, as it was then known, central to the university, and I remember coming out with a statement that got a lot of my fellow deans quite upset. A statement which was blazoned across The Scribe, was that the university can't rise any higher that its College of Liberal Arts, and this sent several deans through the ceiling, but it made an enormous impact on my own faculty, and which was constructive, from the stand point that I needed to gain greater confidence.

Allen: The reference in the notes here to commitment to excellence was based upon the long range plan of 1962, and the theme of Henry, at this time, was the commitment to excellence. We got the university going, now we've got to get improve our faculty, improve our students, all a part of the commitment to excellence. And it is at this time that an awful lot of new personnel come in.

Lee: You mentioned that in conversation and it might well have been from his point of view, that he was trying to bring in, what he regards higher quality deans and what he expected to improve their quality. I've always had just a little bit of nervousness about the word excellence and quality because every college that
I know of, that's ever existed, has claimed it, and some of our rivals or competitors who charge far less, claim that they are just as excellent, that they give excellence at a lower price.

Allen: We are only 12 or 13 years old as a university at this time, and some of our students, we had some excellent students, but some of them, the general level of the students was not that high. And there had been a, while a steady core of faculty, there had been a lot of turnover in faculty, but coming at this time, or shortly after it, are Bernhard Professorships, the Dana Professorships, and we bring in what the faculty referred to as a lot of high powered faculty members from other places in the country. This is true of many colleges but more specifically true in the College of Arts and Sciences. And I was wondering whether this was a part of the charge that you had, or whether it was your way of accomplishing your objectives.

Lee: Well, it could have been, Bill, I just don't recall, but I think making Liberal Arts central is very much related to a commitment to excellence, if you accept my thesis that the university cannot rise higher than its College of Liberal Arts. And therefore, the aim to make liberal arts central had to be done through certain device steps which were obviously a step to higher quality.

Allen: How did you do this?

Lee: Well, I thought about that a little bit. I would say there were several steps, maybe about six steps. The first of them was I had to try to find some way of lifting the morale of the Arts and Sciences faculty, giving them some type of self confidence and self respect, because at that point, the college, I remember vividly, was nothing but a shell actually. It consisted of about 50 full time faculty, but I think, and I might be wrong, but it seems like 60 or 70 part time faculty. I remember, vividly that the part time faculty outnumbered the full time faculty, and given the amount of courses and programs they operated, the number of full time faculty was very, very small. So, also the college felt very much down in the dumps, they felt they were much trodden on and ignored and not thought of as being very important. And they tended to feel very antagonistic towards the College of Education which was a huge empire at that time and

Allen: And which had been getting all the money.

Lee: Right. Liberal Arts had not been getting much support so that was about to change. So I think the first step was to do something or say something which would give the faculty some sense of self respect. Much that I said in the first few months frankly, the rhetoric had to do with making the faculty feel they were important. A statement that a university cannot rise any higher than the Liberal Arts College, while I happen to believe
it, was calculated to say in effect, we were no college like Yale, but, hey, we're important. And it certainly appealed to liberal arts faculty, even if it didn't appeal to my fellow deans.

The second problem, or second step was to try and change the ratio of full time and part time. And, in fact that was done along with another step, namely, to try and bring in some fresh faces. There were some excellent teachers within the college but what we needed were more excellent people. Not just the ones we had, but we needed far more people, and we needed some significant replacements. Also, some of the leadership needed to be upgraded, and so what happened over two years, and looking back on it, this is extraordinary, we brought in fifteen new faculty and ten new chairmen.

Allen: Fifteen or fifty?

Lee: Fifty new faculty and ten new chairman, approximately, over two years, and I think particularly among the chairman, except for your chairman, and who were the chairmen? Oh yes, Dolan and oh yes, Garner. We'll get to that later. But except for those, I believe every chairman was replaced and one way, one reason we were able to do that was the question of our Bernhard Professorships. These came at just the right time, thankfully, and Dr. Littlefield is to be credited with that, and they couldn't have come at a better time when the outlook of the chairman and they did attract top people. Schmidt, Light, Parsons and what was his name? (?). These were very, good people. In retrospect I wonder whether it was good to bring in such good scholars and make them chairman, because the chairmanship duties particularly at that time were very significant, not like today when there are elective clerks, and I've often wondered whether I might have damaged the scholarship of some of those people for doing that, but in any event what happened, as I see it, is that you brought in a dynamic chairman who was a known scholar and that he in turn attracted a lot of younger, good people. And that this began a whole change of the quality of the faculty. Another move beyond that was to move toward graduate work. At the time, I was extremely pleased with myself for having been able to overcome some of the stipulations that Dr. Littlefield made. Dr. Littlefield never thought we would ever be able to get graduate programs because he set a stipulation of, a minimum of 15 students for every graduate course. You might remember that.

Allen: I had that, right.

Lee: It might have been ten, but I believe it as 15.

Allen: 15.

Lee: Was it 15? well that's almost impossible. You are starting
out a program to get 15 people minimum and I'm sure he felt it was impossible. However, you might recall, we invented these twilight courses, that is say courses open to graduate students and also they could be taken, I think by Juniors and Seniors, and obviously we persuaded a large number of seniors to enroll, so that to some people's amazement, including frankly my own, we were able to sneak through 15 or 16, and I think out of maybe 10 graduate courses with which we began we got almost eight or nine into operation. I remember Harold See who was watching this process with great interest, said to me very grudgingly at the end of the registration period, God, you're smelling like a rose.

Allen: Didn't you have an agreement with him that they would support these courses and it didn't come through?

Lee: I don't remember that. I honestly don't. You see you have worked back over this thing.

Allen: You made reference to it in one annual report to this fact. And you found out, only by accident, that he was not doing it. We'll come back to see later.

Lee: The final step, I think, was to try to gain some distinction, a mark of distinction over and beyond graduate programs, because the graduate programs could hardly be called distinctive for such a young school, and that's why we began the Monograph Series, that's why we began the Shakespeare Institute. I think it's one of the best things we ever did in terms of market distinction. An academic excellence was the Shakespeare Institute. For ten years that Institute attracted literally a hundred and here once again I might be off on the figures, I think it was 150 graduate students and English teachers to this campus to study the plays of Shakespeare. And the great thing about that Institute was the way it illustrated how you get market distinction. You don't get market distinction by trying to grab something out of the air and fabricating, you get it by building on something indigenous that you already have. What we had, Harvard didn't, nobody else did, was the Shakespeare Theatre in Stratford, and some of those great figures that came here to lecture. Nobody could touch that and it was a fabulous program. It broke my heart later on to have to phase it out.

Allen: Well, part of the reason for phasing it out was the failure of the Shakespeare Theatre itself.

Lee: Absolutely. Without that, the foundation was cut out from under us but there was an attempt to get me to keep it and there was a certain shock when I said no, because it had been something that I had been very proud of.

The other distinctive element was certainly the Monograph series which was studies of British Health History and Culture if I
recall, under Walter Love, and I was proud of that because I was
told by Love and by Collier who succeeded him at the university
that at least in historical circles, it was a highly respected
series. And I think, although maybe from Harvard's standpoint
(?), it did give the college some scholarly balance, some
scholarly distinction that I thought was important at that time.
So I think those are some of the things that were done to try to
implement this desire to win distinction.

Allen: Now the next question dealt with problems with individual
faculty members. Let me preface this by saying, what was your
evaluation of the faculty that we had, the full time faculty, as
opposed to the part time, when you arrived?

Lee: I'm a little sketchy on that, Bill. Maybe also a little
cautious. I think there were a number of extraordinary teachers
on the faculty, yourself, Kendall, Sherry,. Let me tell you a
true story. It just happened a few days ago, I have just got
back from San Francisco. And on the floor of the ACE, where
there must have been at least five hundred people, one young man
sought me out to give me his card and told me he had graduated
from the University of Bridgeport, by young man, I mean young
administrator, who graduated from the University of Bridgeport
with a BS in Mathematics, and I think it was '57. And I looked
at the card and this man was Provost of the University of
California at Santa Barbara, and I said, you must have had John
Sherry and he said that he did, and in fact he much respected
Sherry and Sherry was one of his inspirations. Likewise at the
alumni meeting I met people who had known Boone, had known van
der Kroef, I'm always speaking to people who knew you, and ob-
viously there was a stratum of faculty there who, although they
might not have had alleged credentials in terms of PHD work,
there were some faculty there who, like faculty in many situa-
tions were lazy, poor teachers, would have no redeeming
characteristics, but I prefer to remember those who were out-
standing teachers.

Allen: I was laying a little trap for you, because in one of
your annual reports, I think your first one, you made a rather
disparaging comment about the faculty that were on board ,and
then you corrected that later by referring to some of the excel-
 lent teachers of the faculty. O.K., let's look at some of the
other individuals. You had a problem with the anti-Communist
League in McCallum, who is currently writing for the Senate, I
believe, and his accusations of Parsons being a communist. You
were involved with that quite a bit, how did you settle it, do
you recall?

Lee: Howard Parsons and I had always been close friends and ac-
tually I never had any problems with Parsons on a personal level.
The problem, from my recollection, I don't remember a lot about
McCallum, except the accusations you have identified, but I do
remember vividly what happened internally. Parsons came to me a few weeks after I became Dean and asked me if I had any objections to his participating in a Marxists Institute, and my question to him, which I remember very well, is it eclectic? That is to say, are there various views? And he said, oh yes, all kinds of, a whole spectrum of views, that's exactly what a university (?) However, when the brochure came out announcing the institute, not only was Howard listed as the director of the institute, which in one sense was o.k., I thought it would be good publicity and very prominently listed in the University of Bridgeport teacher, but Howard's idea of eclecticism was that the main speakers were Herbert Apthecker, Bettina Apthecker, his daughter, and Gus Hall, and of course I really hit the ceiling on that because that's not my definition of eclectic. Nor was it Dr. Littlefield's definition. I hadn't discussed it with the president because it never occurred to me that that was the nature of the institute and of course all hell broke loose, this got a lot of press and the brochure was widely distributed and photographed and Dr. Littlefield was extremely upset. He felt that we had possibly had our fund raising damaged by this, and by the McCallum accusation. I remember also vividly that the actual break in the press occurred while I was in Miami. It might have been Ft. Lauderdale but somewhere in Florida, I think Miami. I was about to, Ginny and I were trying to get away for a week on a Caribbean Cruise. We were staying in a little motel near the boat, and actually the cab had arrived. We had put our luggage in the cab, Ginny was in the cab, and I was going out the door and about to lock the motel door, when the phone rang. I answered the phone and it was Bill Walker, the assistant Dean, and he said, Lee, Dr. Littlefield had just attacked Howard Parsons in the newspaper. I damn near fell through the floor, and it turned out that not only had Henry made a comment which was a negative comment about Howard, got in the press, but Howard was outraged and made a negative comment about Henry in the press. So I called up Howard and I said that I would deeply appreciate it if you wouldn't say anything more until I got back. Just keep a low profile. And also I asked Bill to call the president and say I hope he would also not make any more statements. And when I came back, I don't remember, I'm sure I caught hell from the president, but I don't really remember the kinds of conferences that I had with Henry and with Howard, except that the matter did blow over. One thing I'd like to say about Howard Parsons is that simply that most people don't understand. All communists are probably Marxists, at least they are professed Marxists, but not all Marxists are communists, in my judgment, and there are many gentle Marxists like Howard Parsons, who are really gentle folk, who wouldn't hurt a fly, really, and they might be naive, but in many parts of the world they are very much respected. When I went to Poland in February, without Howard Parsons, I would never gotten the attention I got because it was Howard who laid the ground work and went with me to the various meetings and served as one of the mediaries, and so I think Parsons has been
valuable to UB in terms of his internationalism. I regret that so many of the faculty in that department have been of like mind. I think it is very unhealthy to have all Marxists as well as I would think it would be to not have any Marxists in the department. But that aside, I have always had a certain fondness for Howard but that fondness certainly got tested during this episode.

Allen: Henry had been bitten, so to speak earlier, right after we became a university, when we were accused by someone whose name I do not recall at the moment, of using an Economics textbook which was Communist. This was Samuelson's *Principles of Economics*, one of the most respected, and of course the Board got involved on this and Hans Apel, and everyone else. This is under Halsey's administration of course, and Henry had replied to the press that no Communist would be allowed to teach at the university. So he had a position here which was seemingly under attack and he's going to react.

Lee: Speaking of Howard as an alleged Communist, when I first came back to UB I wanted to have an invocation at the first faculty meeting, in fact I wanted to have that at all faculty meetings, but somebody said, well, that has never been done and at least not done recently, and I said one person I would like to give it is Dr. Parsons because he had been a clergyman, maybe he is still an ordained clergyman. Well, he will never do it, he's a Communist, and I said, oh, I think he will do it, and he gave a beautiful prayer. So in any event, we got by that one.

Allen: O.K. and moving on, Collier and the Dana Speech. This raised quite a howl.

Lee: That was a much more difficult matter which, where really for a few weeks I thought perhaps my career as a Dean would be terminated before it got started. Because it involved an issue of academic freedom. Chris Collier, who was a brilliant but somewhat difficult professor, gave a speech, when he was very young, in which he attacked the university and criticized it for its many weaknesses. And the speech I felt, cause I was in the audience, was about 85% accurate. I didn't have any real problem with the accuracy of what he said. What I did have a lot of problem with, was the forum which he chose to say it, because it happened to be the annual Dana Convocation with Mr. Dana on the stage, and to have a poor judgment to condemn the institution in which Mr. Dana had invested six million, was sheer stupidity. The problem is that about two or three days before the speech, we had a Dean's Council meeting at which we had meted out increments. Some people didn't get any, some people got a regular increment, some got what was called a super increment and there were two categories of super increments in those days, a big super and a little super. This is important only because of a solution to the problem. Collier, Dr. Littlefield and I had
agreed that Collier would get a super increment, a big super increment, because of, I guess he'd done some publications, he was an outstanding teacher and so forth, and we decided that he would get not just a super but a big super increment. Three days later the speech was given. Mr. Dana was outraged, absolutely livid, and he apparently stormed into Dr. Littlefield's office and demanded that Collier be fired. Even at that period of time Dr. Littlefield must have realized that to fire a professor would create more problems to solve, but Littlefield was determined to punish Collier and I sympathized with his anger about this matter. The question was how to punish him in such a way as to satisfy Mr. Dana, while still not punishing him so much as to raise an issue of academic freedom on which I would have had to resign, cause I did think the issue, the critical issue was the right to speak out. And you know we solved it the way that it's solved in the United Nations. Namely with the language which left each side saying what was best for them. The agreement that we had privately, and this have never been told so far as I know, is that Collier would not get his big super increment, by God, and Mr. Dana would be told, that even though he'd been promised that he would not get it. On the other hand I could go to collier and say I had protected his increment because in fact he would get a little super increment, so I went to the, I was able to go to Collier and say, I have protected your super increment and because I had in sense, and Littlefield was able to get to Dana I have taken away the super increment which he had in a sense. I thought in retrospect it was brilliant, and of course it could never have been so great had there not been little supers and big supers in those days. So we got by that one and I think, however, it altered Dr. Littlefield's attitude toward Collier and it certainly made me more wary of Collier in the future.

Allen: I have in quotes "fakes", people with false credentials, would you care to make any comment upon that?

Lee: Well, those are fascinating stories and the full answers would be quite lengthy but to try to put it briefly, there were two instances where enormous frauds were uncovered. And in my experience, I can't remember anything comparable to this. I have been involved with fraud before, but never after they were hired. I've always been able to protect the person with (?) The tragedy in the case of these two men, is that they were really superb teachers, absolutely superb teachers, and I would say in one case, a superb person. In the case of Garner, William Garner, Garner was a allegedly a doctor of science from the University of Liverpool, if I remember correctly. is that right, Bill?

Allen: Leeds, I believe.

Lee: Leeds, thank you, you are right. And i became suspicious of Garner very early on, because for one thing he wouldn't teach
anything except freshman courses. And although I thought it was admirable for a chairman to teach freshman courses, he would get very nervous when it was suggested he teach anything else, it seemed to be peculiar. Also, on one occasion, Garner falsified a proposal to the NSF by giving false numbers which was puzzling because as a scientist you are usually very careful. What happened was that my suspicions were such that I wrote to the University of Leeds to ask whether in fact he had a doctor of science degree, and I received a letter back from the registrar of the university, on the registrar's stationary, stating yes indeed he did, and he had been outstanding there and that as a matter of fact the doctor of science was a higher degree in his estimate, than the PHD. I felt like a fool because being an English Lit person, I thought I had been very stupid in this regard. However, as you know my successor was Karl Larson, the physicist. Karl had similar suspicions, but of course knew more about physics. Karl had a relative who lived in England and went to Leeds and found out in fact that Dr. Garner did not have a degree with Leeds, no recollection.

It turned out the letter I had received was not from Leeds but Garner had intercepted it at Dana Hall and that he had written a letter of his own on Leeds stationary, shades of Fernando, Walter De Marra, the great impersonator. That was a real tragedy because Garner was superb with freshman.

The other one was Francis Dolan. And who I considered, a very good friend, incidentally the way these things are discovered, I was very proud of my chairman, particularly after I got them to move and I had a little brochure in which I had a little paragraph about how good my chairman were, and what they'd done and in Dolan's write up there was a statement that he had won the King Gustaf award for eye research. And in Garner's write up there was a statement that he had won the Faraday Medal and it turns out there was no King Gustaf award and as far as the Faraday thing was concerned, there was a Faraday award but he never won it. It's a long story but in both cases they were ultimately exposed and I had very mixed emotions about the exposure. Because you know Fernando Walter DeMarra was a great teacher and in fact DeMarra took over a prison, pretended to be a prison expert, took over a prison in Texas and nobody could handle them, he handled them, so it makes you kind of cry that talents like that had to do what they did, and that we couldn't recognize the talents and give them a break. Those were vivid recollections.

Allen: How and why did you get rid of Roucek?

Lee: I'm not, did I get rid of Roucek or did he resign?

Allen: Well, he resigned, but you got rid of him.
Lee: That's been my technique for a long time. Tell me about it because I don't remember.

Allen: I don't remember much about it.

Lee: I know that he was impossible and I would say Roucek was a fake but of a different type. Roucek did have a PhD, that wasn't a lie. Roucek did write books, but they weren't his books. And what Roucek, Roucek was a minor, petty criminal in the sense that Roucek stole other people's work. Roucek was also, had great difficulties with the other sex and took advantage of his position as a teacher to harass the other sex, so that I had always felt that Dolan was a very fine personality, and that Garner was a brilliant man even though he didn't have the credentials, but with Roucek, I felt that Roucek was maybe the worse kind of fake I suppose. Roucek really took advantage of younger people and I guess you're telling me that I forced him out. I don't recall that, but I know-

Allen: That's the impression that most of us had at that time and we somewhat admired it. I think you arranged a sabbatical.

Lee: Well I wanted to move him out but I don't remember the details.

Allen: How were you able to get from Henry, assistant deans and so forth where Dr. Ropp had been unsuccessful, even in getting secretaries?

Lee: Well, I don't know what Ropp's problems were, but I think it need be understood that I was there, it was a lush period at UB. I suspect that when Ropp was there, at least part of the time, it wasn't. UB was generating massive operating surpluses. As a matter of fact, it was even building buildings with the surpluses. The first building that ever had money raised for it was the building that I built here, the recreation center. So there were massive surpluses and in that environment an aggressive person who has some ideas for his college can make some headway. The question that Dr. Littlefield, in my recollection, was not whether you'd gotten positions, but how many? And I remember vividly in one instance in which he had promised me four new positions, but when the time came to collect them, I couldn't find the memo and neither could he. This taught me a lesson, incidentally, and he insisted in my producing the memo in writing, and I remember I finally found the memo and it was not from him unfortunately, but it was from me in which I said this is to acknowledge your memo in which you assured me of four positions. I always did that, and I took that to him, I guess over at Cortright, and remember putting it on the deck in front of him. I remember he read it and I remember exactly what he said to me after he read it. He said, You know, Miles, he said, you not only put an umbrella up my rear but he said you opened
it. That exactly what he said. And then he wrote, approved HWL and the date and he said, take this and get out of here. But the important thing about that was he kept his word. I think I was fortunate to be here in the golden period. When, you remember I had a reputation as being a big spender. Well, you could be a big spender cause there's a lot of money and the positions came through. I don't think it was any skill of my own.

I want to say also with regard to assistant dean, that the person that I appointed, Bill Walker, was a superb assistant dean and did a great deal to build that body of procedures which is the foundation of any efficient college, even today, I understand from others, the College of Arts and Humanities uses procedures and handbooks that Bill actually developed. He deserves a great deal of credit for that.

Allen: We haven't had a chance to get together with him, it's a case of scheduling, but I do want to interview him.

Lee: I should think Bill's recollections

Allen: Well, he had a reputation of knowing every rule and regulation that had ever been promulgated. You said in your report to the planning committee in January of '66, that the Council of Deans was archaic. Why?

Lee: I don't remember that buy I can remember why I might have said it. It seemed to me that it did a lot of work, that should have been relegated to much lower level officers. If you have a collection of deans sitting around, killing courses that didn't have more than six people, you give a directive to a registrar that any course less than six people is killed and you don't keep deans in hours and hours and hours until midnight doing that. I thought that was archaic arrangement, and inefficient, and also I think that it interfered with the dean's prerogatives in managing their respective houses. I didn't want a business dean telling me what liberal arts professor I was going to promote or reward. That meant my losing all the opportunities I had to lead that college. Nor did I wish to tell the business dean what he should do. I felt that there was massive interference by the other deans in the affairs of Liberal Arts. And of course they looked at Liberal Arts very differently (?) and it just seemed to me to be totally unacceptable. That, however, is how it operated.

Allen: This is a part I think was a part of the evolution and the growing pains on the whole subject of governance. We come to another aspect of governance later but I know that in reading the minutes of the Council of Deans, it gives you their actions and their trivia.

Lee: The Council of Deans collectively has always been one of
the weakest and may I say dullest groups on campus. When we have, when we were just starting here some years ago, personnel orientation, we had various groups who were seeking to orient the new personnel, and we had a critique sheet where if you were a new person you could indicate which program you liked best. We discovered very rapidly that the program, the part of the program the new people like best was the Student Council Officers, they thought they were terrific and exciting new group. The group they liked the least and said were the dullest were the Dean's Council. Maybe that's always true with deans.

Allen: You may recall that appended to early copies of the constitution of the Senate there was a statement on the place of the Council of Deans in the university. This was because, before you came and in the early days of the university, the Dean's Council was all powerful, very, very powerful. Partly in a sense because Henry listened to them. Henry always made the decisions. He had the majority vote but the word amongst the faculty was that the Dean's Council had too much power and they were usurping the power of the faculty, so many of us on the Senate, including myself, raised that issue and we forced the deans to come up with a definition of what they were and how they did it and got it appended as an appendix to the constitution.

Lee: A dangerous document, I would say.

Allen: Those were the days when I was the faculty rebel.

Lee: I know exactly what you were up to.

Allen: In August of '65, Dr. Littlefield reported to the board that he had conferences with you and Dr. See on your hopes and aspirations after being here for one year. What were they?

Lee: I would suspect without knowing for sure that this alluded to the vice, the new position of Academic Vice President. My recollections are as follows: That Henry was about to, thinking about establishing a vice president position similar to Academic Affairs, and my impression, it might be wrong, is that he wasn't terribly enthusiastic about having such a position but the Board felt that the time had come to have it. I think it's pretty common knowledge that Harold and I were interested in this position. At this point, actually, I had wanted to remain at UB, but I was receiving very strong approaches from Alfred University, and my position, as I best remember it, I have to caution you, I know that everybody rationalizes their behavior from memory. My best recollection is that I wanted to remain at UB, but thought that if I couldn't have the vice presidency, I should proceed to Alfred, and that probably was a subject of discussion at the Board.

Allen: A somewhat related question to that, how did you get
along with Dr. See?

Lee: I have some special notes on that. I would say our relationships as I saw them, were a bit erratic, up and down. I think each of us had a healthy respect for the other. Certainly I had a healthy respect for him as a very formidable colleague and sometimes antagonist. There were very few major moves I wanted to make that could be made without very careful considering how he would react and what to do with him if he reacted negatively. I think Harold See would have made a great university president here or elsewhere, except for some character problem. Basically, a leader has got to pull people together, a leader, a university shouldn't separate people and I think that so that I admired him, in a sense that he had far greater knowledge in higher education than I did. He had much greater theoretical knowledge, he had much more broadly based in terms of knowing administrative techniques and historical precedents for various types of administrative decisions. He had all the language of the administration. He had a lot of things that I lacked. But his inability to bring people together and the tendency to divide them was unfortunately a characteristic.

I think basically, the relationship between us has got to be understood within the context of the following comments. You've got to realize first of all, that there has been historically a basic conflict between Liberal Arts College and the College of Education and you've seen this recently in the case of the education department placed in the College of Arts and Humanities. I think it's the right place for it. He simply couldn't live with a Liberal Arts Dean and faculty. He finally broke out of and insisted on going

End of Side One of Tape

Side Two of Tape.

Allen: Ok, you were saying that the current Education Department broke out of, or requested breaking out from the Art and Humanities College, and it was tragic for both the Department and the Deans.

Lee: It was tragic for the Department because they can gain from operating within the Liberal Arts context. It was tragic for the College because they are going to lose an awful lot of SCH. The demographics swing up again, and I told Nazzaro directly, he is going to be the greatest sucker in this. But the point is that it illustrates the conflict between these two types of colleges. In addition, I felt that I had a mandate, even if self appointed, to make the College of Liberal Arts central, where in fact the College of Education had been central. And had gotten the funding. Obviously this was going to create a confrontation in relationships. Finally, at that particular time,
and still, I disagreed strongly with the nature of teacher preparation. I have always committed to teacher preparation, as I will be saying in a press conference in just about a week now, in addressing a certain problem. But, I have never liked the idea of majoring in education, and minoring the field. I thought it should be the reverse, and that is not what we were doing. So I had that philosophical difference. I think these factors, all of them created an almost automatic rivalry, and confrontation, despite whatever else we might have thought. And yet, I think there were some very happy moments with Harold. He and I both enjoyed the Puerto Rican operation. And I think I told you before, that it gave me a visibility in Puerto Rico, where we could be more relaxed. We would have a very enjoyable time with each other. I am told, through some one else, that he didn't understand why I could be such a nice person in Puerto Rico and such an S.O.B. in Bridgeport. And that might be a comment which symbolizes the whole relationship.

Allen: OK. I appreciate that. Sometime I will let you see Harold's interview.

Lee: I don't want to.

Allen: You were much more generous than he.

Lee: I'm sure. No, I'm not sure, it occurred to me that that might be the case, but I'd rather stand with what I have said.

Allen: Were you able to make the Arts and Science College central to the University?

Lee: I think not. I think in the last analysis, not, really I think it was an impossible dream. In this sense, that, Yes for a few years, Yes, but I think ultimately, the destiny of this institution is not in that direction. I am sorry that is so, because I would have been, the last decade, much more comfortable at UB, if it had been. I think UB's destiny is not Swarthmore, Hamilton, or even Alfred. I think UB's destiny is very strong in the professional, the so called professional fields, especially the engineering sciences, and with strong liberal arts support. And in that sense, liberal arts can't be central in the way that I meant it when I said it earlier. I think you asked here, questions about failures and successes, I think I probably would rightly be judged not to have been successful in the long run in making the liberal arts central. On the other hand, I don't think it's been possible to push around the liberal arts beyond my tenure, as it had been earlier. Liberal Arts has been a major factor to contend with in what ever the University wanted to do, whereas before, it was simply brushed aside and considered inconsequential.

You asked also about failures. I am more sensitive to those,
than the successes. I'd say, in terms of people, that I felt I brought in some wonderful faculty, and I have got to admit that I brought in some awful faculty. This always happens in hiring, you make misjudgments. I think some of the people that came in were superb teachers. And wonderful people. Some of them we tried to make into administrators, and that didn't work. You warned me about one, and it turned out you were right. But I think Schmidt was, has been a good teacher. I think Parsons has been an outstanding teacher, and both of them fine scholars. I am proud that I brought them in. On the other hand, there are others that I would not name, that became enormous disappointments because they became bibliophiles and really began to neglect their teaching. It is very difficult, Bill, for the person involved, to make judgments on his own tenure as a dean or whatever. That is the most honest answer I can give.

Allen: I might say that you are the, one of the few people who would talk about that question on failures.

Lee: Oh, really?

Allen: The majority of the people that I ask that question, don't recall any failures.

Lee: You know, I once published an annual report, this is one of the few times the Board got very unhappy with me. I thought I was supposed to be honest, so I had a section on failures. The Board, most of the Board people are business executives. They in an annual report, you don't put, you try to avoid putting them in. I think it lends a certain credibility.

Allen: Well, some of the annual reports for the Junior College emphasized failures too.

Lee: Did they? Probably didn't have anything else at that early point.

Allen: Do you recall your role in the Senate reconsideration of General Education in the fall of '66?

Lee: I'm a little hazy here on my chronology. I don't recall that specific year, but I do recall what the faculty ultimately did with the core and whether that began in '66, I suspect. OK Then I'm in sync.

The faculty began to consider General Education in '66. I think it as late as '69 or '70 when they actually dumped the Core? Dumped the General Education requirements?

Allen: No that was in, about '69 or '70.

Lee: I thought it was. OK. I just want to say a word about
that, because I felt that that was not the faculty's finest hour. And when I asked them when I came back, and discovered there was no liberal arts core, as we call it today, and I asked some of the faculty, Why? What Happened? Their general reaction was, you wouldn't understand. The barbarians were at the door of the Senate. The barbarians were about to crash down the door of the Senate. You knew we had to do it. Too much student pressure. And I thought that was a rather ignoble reason to do it, and that it was not the faculty's finest hour. Definitely Not. Now, If I had been here, I would have fought that to the death. And in fact, shortly after I got back, I did assemble a very tiny group of faculty that I thought would be working on this to plot, literally plot, how to get it back.

Allen: I remember that.

Lee: Were you one of those? It was in my home, and then we broadened the group, and later on we got a fairly wide movement going, and in fact we then got it through the Senate. Dr. Eigel was very skillful in doing that. I, what ultimately came out of the Senate was a great disappointment to me because there was a beautiful liberal arts core described in LRPI, the first Long Range Plan. Should have called it the second one, because of the earlier one.

Allen: There were several ones.

GO TO NEXT PAGE.
Lee: But the pattern in LRP I was beautiful, I thought. But happened was, something that I am going to write about. What happened was what I call the politics of the core. The porkbarreling and the log rolling, among departments to protect their own SCHs, with the result is that what we have got, is as bad as what Harvard had had, namely nothing but, what do you call them, distribution requirements. Harvard discovered that it didn't have high enrollment in some of the sophomore, junior courses, so it make up a string of them and said, now you have to enroll in this for the core. That is not my idea of a core. And my idea was to have courses designed, particularly for the core, interdisciplinary and team taught. And in all the pork barreling and politicking, what we got was distribution requirements. However it was at least a political victory. At least we got something. At least we restored the principle of general education. So if I had been, I don't recall what my role was in the fall of '66, maybe there is some record of it.

Allen: Yes there is. And very briefly, when the, to refresh your memory, the big thing that was about to kill it in the Senate, was the control body that would oversee such a core. And the representation by college. So you caucused with the Senators from A&S, and you later said this was the first time this was ever done, because I had told you that that was the first time. And then you got a combined caucus between A&S and Education Senators, and -

Lee: I do Remember that.

Allen: Together, this was a majority of the faculty membership.

Lee: What happened to Education?

Allen: This came out a luncheon meeting. You took Lloyd MacMackin, and me, over to Maloney's for lunch. And we hammered

Lee: He was in Education.

Allen: Yes, he was an Education professor in the Senate. And he had taken over much of the work that Bill McKenzie had done on this general liberal education program. And out of this we developed the scenario which then worked.

LEE: To bring the two caucuses together?

Allen: And then to get it through the Senate. As a matter of fact, you had some very, very favorable comments that I have somewhere in my notes, about the value of caucus.

Lee: Oh Really?
Allen: in getting the Senate to operate.

Lee: It is very interesting. I made the comments to the Senate or Later?

Allen: You made them later. I think it was in your annual report.

Lee: And what did we prevent happening by doing that?

Allen: We prevented the complete loss of any general education program.

Lee: Because the control group that was being considered would be one that would have wiped it out?

Allen: There would have been no control group. The whole measure would have died.

Lee: Oh, you mean the measure was to wipe it out?

Allen: The effect of it, because there could not be any agreement on the control group, that the whole measure would have been killed.

Lee: I see. So we were able to create -

Allen: We changed the name and the composition a little bit, but A&S and Education had the dominate role.

Lee: OK. Probably the control group was proportionate to the Senate membership.

Allen: No it wasn't, this was something that we -

Lee: What was it? Mostly Liberal Arts, apparently.

Allen: We had almost a majority, but we needed Education to keep the majority, and they, in order to salvage something, went along with us.

Lee: That is interesting. Then, I guess what you are saying is that for a brief time we were able to beat down the effort to eliminate it. Is that it?

Allen: Yes. And out of it we got a very good core.

Lee: But then later on -

Allen: Later on we lost it.
Lee: That is fascinating, Bill.

Allen: Now somewhat related to that, what are your estimates on the effectiveness of the Senate? And I caution you not to transfer your later ideas.

Lee: Well, early on, I think it was important and central to the university. The university had been too paternalistic, to use no other word, it had been dominated by a very few people. I would say that that it was critical to have that type of body. And I might say that the continuing existence of that body today is very important in certain future plans that the university has. I think the beginning of the end of the usefulness of the Senate came with unionism, because what happened here, happened historically at most schools, the union decided to try to take over the Senate, and it has done that to some extent, in that it has very deeply infiltrated the Senate. So that what's happened now is, on the part of the union, a confusion between collective bargaining and effective faculty governance.

When the New England Association visiting team was here on reaccreditation, a year or so ago, they pointed this out. The faculty has got governance mixed up with bargaining. you can't confuse the two or you destroy governance. I would say that in your time, the very best people were sought to be on the Senate, and when the faculty voted on its senators, it tried to get the most powerful, articulate people with the most influence among their peers, to become Senator. Today, nobody wants to be on the Senate, and you almost have to beg somebody to be on it. The result is that the Senate membership is very weak, it is given to some new person who doesn't know what is going on or somebody who wants to be on it and really has no ability and so forth.

Today I see the Senate is paralyzed, or perhaps there is even, it is asleep. Paralyzed suggests some minor activity maybe, or some strength that is being held down, but the Senate is simply dormant, and it is a tragedy because the Senate does not seem to be capable of generating any agenda by itself. The only way it can get an agenda is to have the union present something, or to have the administration present something.

Allen: It is completely reactive.

Lee: Exactly. In fact I have been asked sometimes, rather desperately, can't you give us something to work on. I think that shows the long way down the Senate has come since your day when it was a very vital body.

Allen: This leads us, incidentally, to something that, after I finish this book, that might be very, very valuable to do. When you have retired and I have finished the book, that we sit down for several long, fairly structured taping sessions for
posterity, on your administration.

Lee: On my present administration? I'd rather rest first.

Allen: Oh Yes, I said after this occurs. No, this is not some-
thing I would want to plunge into on the 2nd of July. OK, were
you aware of Board discussion of a Massive Gift in the spring of
'66?

Lee: No I wasn't. Of course the Dean had very little contact
with the Board. In view of the one you mentioned, a few months
ago, and I presume this was the Bernhard family.

Allen: He was on the Committee. As was Henry duPont.

Lee: They were considering a massive gift from Bernhard?

Allen: No, they were actually trying to get somebody to approach
Dana.

Lee: Oh, I see, Rename the university?

Allen: And it would involve the renaming of the University. I
have forgotten now whether it was 25 or 50 million, both those
figures were bandied about as the price for renaming the
university. As a matter of fact, as I recall that question was
rather pointedly asked by Bernhard.

Lee: Well, that might explain certain more recent negotiations
and discussions. I didn't know that, Bill, I really didn't.

Allen: If you want, I can look up the, my notes on that meeting
as well as its membership.

Lee: That would be fascinating, it would be helpful -

Allen: I'll turn this off. I can look those up, and I can find
them very quickly, and let you read the notes.

Lee: It's fascinating.

Allen: Alright, do you recall the Dean's retreat in Atlantic
City? in April '67.

Lee: Well, only in very general terms. I remember it was a lot
of fun, and very stimulating. I have a vision in my mind of Dr.
Littlefield putting some things up the blackboard, or maybe it
was Halsey. I remember that it was kind of a lark in that most
of us felt the pressure, and I also remember that we felt a big
bang about getting close to the president. It was a different
atmosphere in which the top people were a little bit more
relaxed, and friendly and it was kind of fun to be with them.
Incidentally, today, the last few months, we've started an administrative Council, where the Dean's Council meets with the Cabinet each month. And they get a big bang out of it, so it's a similar thing.

Bill, I don't remember, in fact you could refresh my memory. What did they decide?

Allen: I am not sure. Well, again I have the notes. Not much was decided, excepting some aspects of planning, aspiration, goals and objectives, but, the faculty were fascinated about this junket to Atlantic City. And it is one of the few times, incidentally, that faculty didn't find out what went on. Most of us at this time, had sources, and we had a network, for example, if I saw the right person ten minutes after a deans Council meeting, I knew what happened at the Deans Council. But is one thing we didn't.

Alright, how did you promote faculty and student communication as a Dean?

Lee: Well, two major ways. With students, I started what was I understand the first advisory committee at UB. Student Advisory Committee. And you know I still meet those students, very much as you meet those thousands of people you taught. I very frequently bump into those students. At San Francisco, two students were waiting for me as I walked into the room where we were having an Alumni reunion, and said, you know, we were on your advisory committee. I still have an ash tray they gave me, to Dean Miles, on my desk. Really in retrospect, what that advisory committee was, was a consumer advisory meeting. You know Stu Leonard, Stu Leonard and his food store? He was in The Search for Excellence book. This is what Stu Leonard does, he has an advisory committee that comes in once a month to tell him what they think of his products. That's what we did, and at that time, we didn't call it that, but it was pretty progressive.

Secondly, with regard to faculty, a variety of things, but the most important thing I guess, was the Scholars Group which is still going on. The Scholars Group was supposed to concentrate wholly on the subject of the paper to be read for the evening, you recall. And the paper could be on laser beams, or Soviet Russia, or whatever, and all the discussion was to be focused on that particular subject. You remember we had a rule that, and still have it, that there cannot be any discussion except the paper or related matters. But we all know there was a lot of discussion of other things, and it gave an opportunity to talk with faculty outside of the rigid chains of command, and to learn a great deal from them and to learn about their concerns. Also, it created a camaraderie that was very helpful on both sides. I think, I would guess that the faculty have enjoyed that more than almost anything.
Allen: I know the ones that I went, when I was your Assistant, I enjoyed tremendously, because it was an opportunity to get away from the day to day administrative things.

Lee: Well, you know, we'd drink and we'd eat, and it was a, I feel good about that thing, and I hope the new president will continue it.

Allen: Alright, we have already commented upon Dr. See, unless you have something else to add. What were your relations with Dr. Halsey?

Lee: OK. I would say that on Dr. Halsey, first of all, I much admired the uniqueness of the Halsey International Scholarship program. I think this was almost a single handed effort to make UB international. It was actually unique in the strict grammatical sense, in so far as I know it is still unique. I don't think there is anything like it with the host families and so forth. And Ginny and I were both very admiring of their inauguration of that enterprise. Also we very much admired them as a husband and wife team. They were very formidable, they worked together. I remember very vividly that while I was still at Alfred, Eli Black, one of my Alfred Trustees, wanted to do something to help Alfred, and decided to have a fund raising reception for Ginny and Me in Westport. He asked me if there anybody from UB that I would like to include, which was his way of being considerate. And I made the very serious error of suggesting it might be nice to Chancellor and Mrs., Halsey. Well, they cut through that crowd like a knife through hot butter. And at some point, I grabbed hold of Jim and I said, You know Jim, this is for me. we are supposed to be the center of attention. I remember he said, "All's fair in love and war". I said, "Is this war?" He said, "You bet".

They were formidable fund raisers, particularly in attracting people with a liberal persuasion, and people outside of Greater Bridgeport industry.

Allen: It was he who got Arnold Bernhard, you know.

Lee: I am sure it was. Oh, yeah, no question at all about that. And in fact, I had dinner just a few nights ago in New York, with Jacques Stone, a very prominent international banker, and discovered to my amazement that Jacques' first affiliation with UB was through the Halseys. In fact I think the Halseys brought into UBs orbit a number of Westporters and Down Liners, who then were allowed to drift away from the University afterwards, which is unfortunate. Because they, in many cases were monied people. I would say that in the case of Chancellor Halsey, in retrospect, I have seen him somewhat differently than I did at the time. Just as I see Dr. Littlefield now somewhat differently in time.
In retrospect, it's obvious to me that the Halseys were primarily visionaries. And I do not mean that in a pejorative sense. But he did not have great management abilities, whereas, to oversimplify it, Littlefield was perhaps the reverse. I think that is an oversimplification. But to some extent they complimented each other and to some extent this two headed monster that the Board created, the president and the chancellor, had the logic that each man did have skills that complimented the other.

Allen: This of course, this two headed monster goes back from the Junior College days.

Lee: Does it go back that far?

Allen: And then when Halsey became President, both Halsey and Littlefield reported to the Board, and they had their own specialties, which continued until eventually even after Henry became President, he was not CEO, there was an Administrative Council which was chaired by Halsey as Chancellor.

Lee: Who was CEO?

Allen: There was no CEO.

Lee: Oh, there was no CEO.

Allen: More likely the Chairman of the Board was CEO.

Lee: I didn't know that.

Allen: And it was only after, when this didn't work for about six months, that Henry got the Board to declare him the CEO.

Lee: Oh, I see. Well, I like to say jokingly that I am the economy model, I do both of those things, in the sense that there is only one person now, although I guess you could argue that Halsey was in effect a vice president for development. In any event, I think, I see now what I didn't see then, that obviously he lacked management ability. Also I come to see the HISP program in a different light. I still think the HISP program was very valuable to us, because it gave, as you know, very well, it gave us a foundation from which to catapult into where we are now in international recruitment. It gave us a quality base for doing that because those HISP scholars were excellent. However, I have begun to realize that at least some portion of the Halsey program was PR rather than substance and that the publicity attached to it went way beyond what really was happening. What really was happening was about 16 scholars, not 800. And also that the, well let's put it this way, there were 3,000 volunteers, seldom have so many people raised so little money. And, as John Cox once said, incredible amount of frantic activity to produce rather little in terms of income. I think the value
of the program was not so much the volunteers, almost none of those volunteers became significant donors, it was the quality of the scholars themselves, the Halsey Scholars were very high caliber, and they had a very disproportionate positive effect on the intellectual quality of the campus. That is where in the last analysis, I think the value of the Halseys came.

You are going to ask me about Dr. Littlefield, of course?

Allen: Oh, yes, that is next.

Lee: With regard to Henry Littlefield, I think perhaps, we, my situation is the reverse. In the case of Halsey, looked like a president, had all the aura of a president, my initial reaction was to regard him almost as saintly status. I realize none of us are in that category.

In the case of Littlefield, I would say that I began with some real reservations and confrontations, because of the very nature of our relationship. But have wound up in retrospect, realizing that much of what we did was absolutely necessary to protect and maintain the institution. More precisely, I certainly was irritated initially by what I regarded as high handedness, and an over dominance of the people around him. I remember one situation that you might have alluded to when you said he was the majority, where he had left the room, hurriedly for some reason, he had been called out and the rest of the Deans were discussing a certain matter, which I forget, and finally everybody was in agreement, and I said as the junior Dean, we are in agreement, and an older Dean, I think it was Eaton Read, said in that big, profound, basso voice of his, "No, Lee, we can't yet, because the majority hasn't voted".

Allen: That is one thing, I have got that story four times, and it is almost word for word by everybody.

Lee: Good, He was very much like that. The impressive thing about Littlefield in those days was that he kept his word, which is absolutely critical to being a leader. In retrospect, I realize now, better than even he does, that this school has been historically an impoverished school, even when it was rich, it was impoverished, relatively rich. It was and is enrollment driven, its revenues derived almost totally from student charges, and it is a very precarious situation for a school to be in. And that even when he was riding high, and the school was riding high, it still was in a precarious situation, and required the most careful monitoring of the budget, the most careful control. It is no coincidence that I kept Hank Henegan in Waldemere. I didn't have room for both Hank and Ed, one had to go. It was no coincidence, I had to have Hank. Hank and I meet almost daily on the budget. You'd be amazed. Sometimes three times. It is a terribly difficult situation to keep this place in balance, and it requires
somewhat dictatorial control. In retrospect then, I see that that was the case with Henry. The great contribution of Henry, beyond that of course, was Dana. And I am not prepared to get into the who discovered Dana contest. In fact I am not sure that even you can unravel that.

Allen: I have got it all unraveled.

Lee: OK, great, But -

Allen: Documentary evidence.

Lee: Well that is good, but I would say regardless of who claims what, it is no question of how Mr. Dana saw it. That's - Mr. Dana perceived Henry as the person to get along with, whoever discovered him might be somebody else, so I think that Henry was the key to Dana, and that would seem to me to be the truth regardless of how much it irritated others.

We have gotten through your questions, Haven't we?

Allen: Well, you have indicated that you were an applicant for the position of Vice President?

Lee: No, I wouldn't say that, Bill. I don't think I ever applied for the position. I think informally, I think I indicated my interest in it. And I do remember one Senior who came to me last night, when this issue reached its crescendo, Dr. Littlefield invited me to go out in the automobile with him. I had a president do that once before at Cincinnati, he got very angry with me over something I said about basketball. He invited me to take a ride with him in the car. And in the car you can't get out, you see. So you are kind of vulnerable. But I remember we drove up Park Avenue, and parked right at the intersection of Park and University, and he kept the engine running, I guess he was still afraid somebody might have appeared, and I remember the situation boiled down to this, that I had the offer from Alfred, by that time, and I don't want to use the word ultimatum, because it wasn't that, but I indicated that I had to know and if he didn't move, that I was going to take the offer at Alfred, and in fact he didn't move, and I did take the offer.

Allen: I refer to the minutes of the VPAA Search Committee, 31 October 1966, The discussed "in considerable detail the qualifications and administrative capabilities of Dean ____ (the name is out), of the University of Bridgeport. After review of the facts as presented by Henry LITTLEFIELD, it was agreed to keep looking, although this dean's name was still kept on the list." This is part of a long, long story which we will-

Lee: You have got a much better handle on that I do.
Allen: Alright, aside from the opportunity to become president of Alfred, Why did you leave UB is pretty much redundant at this point because I think you have answered that.

Lee: Yeah, I have. Henry had failed to move.

Allen: We have talked something about your greatest successes as Dean, Do you wish to add anything.

(Noise in background)

That is our signal that he about to turn off the power.

Lee: Can we get out of here?

Allen: Oh yes, as a matter of fact, he is half an hour early.

OK do you have anything to add to your successes as a dean?

Lee: No I really don't, Bill.

Allen: And you came up with the failures, you volunteered those earlier.

Lee: Yeah, well, I think the success, were probably that for a few years Arts and Sciences became very strong element at UB and that ever since then, it has become a force to be reckoned with, even in its current weakened condition because of the marketplace. And maybe that is the greatest success. I don't feel terribly comfortable discussing that. I think that an outside person can judge those much better than I can. Yeah, the Monograph Series was a success. In one sense the Shakespeare Institute was a fabulous success. But I don't think the Shakespeare INSTITUTE is critical to the welfare of current UB. My memory is so much influenced by the last 12 years. before that it a little hazy.

Allen: Yeah, this is twenty odd years ago.

Lee: I am willing to trust to your judgment as to what seemed to be important and successful, and what wasn't.

Allen: Alright. Do you have anything else that you would like to add?

Lee: Do you want to comment just on these points about '74, to put them on the record, but nothing more about the deanship.

Would you call Kathy and tell her that I will be back at 5, that I only have a few more comments.

(Tape Off. Not really, was on during phone call)
Lee: I think you have an enviable position, particularly where it comes the deanship because you were there and you were involved in some of the Senate maneuvers, and were working your way up ultimately, so I think you have got an insight that almost nobody has.

What I wanted to do Bill, just record a few observations, which I think you already know about, but to be sure these are recorded for any future historical research, but the condition I'm laying on these comments is that they are to remain confidential until I step down from the Presidency. I would prefer that they remain confidential until my relationship with the University ends two years beyond the Presidency, but I would be willing to discuss that with some historical researcher. Because of what I am going to say, it will be obvious why I would not want these things commented on before. But one of the problems that I see arising is that many of the trustees today have no ideas what it was like in '74. Many of the administrative officers have gone. I think before it is lost, somebody, who had to confront the situation, needs to know about it from our point of view. What I basically want to do is to make only five points. And these had to do with the effort to try to make people understand the absolute chaos, from my point of view, that existed when I returned, from my point of view. And the extreme difficulty of trying to get the place back on the stripe.

The first point has to do with collective bargaining. And what I think is not generally known, is that the Board, through intermediaries, the trustee intermediaries, assured me that there would be a three year contract on my desk when I arrived. You recall this. At the time I was invited to come back, I put it out that I was very worried about the union situation, I knew nothing about it, I had no expertise on it, and that I didn't think I could handle it. The Board said, don't worry, we appreciate that, that you will have a three year contract, and even a half way intelligent person can learn something in three years, to which I agreed.

When I got back, there wasn't a scrap of a piece of paper toward the contract, that was August 15th and the faculty went on strike on September the first. Also, I remember, as you do, calling the faculty together and pointing out to them that I was in this situation and that I really had no expertise in this area, and I wished they would give me a chance for a few months to try to pull things together, to which they replied that they couldn't do that, and in fact there would be a contract on September the First or one of us would pull the valve, so to speak, and Howard Parsons made the now famous comment, that I shouldn't take it personally. Also it is interesting to know that I had a great debt here to Jim Fenner. Jim came to me and said, let's try to write a contract. We got some English professors together and we
probably got a few other people together, I am very hazy who they were, but we sat down and wrote a contract. Unfortunately, we knew nothing about bargaining, they didn't know any more than I did. And the contract was based on some old AAUP documents like the 1940 Principles, which it turns out were the worst possible to have in a contract, because it was based upon Principles and Principles were subject to all sorts of legal wrangling. It's a philosophical document, not a bargaining document. There was never a worse contract from the bargaining point of view, and it was bad, and had to be undone, because we were so ignorant and had do do it rapidly. That is the first thing that I want to mention.

The Second thing was that in addition to facing the bargaining problem, the Board Chairman resigned one week after I arrived. It might have been ten days, it might have been two weeks. But very shortly after I arrived, to my astonishment, with no warning, the Board Chairman resigned. The person who had brought me to UB. That was a shock. I could then find no one who would become Board Chairman. No body would take the job. There was a great feeling of liability here, nobody wanted to be in a position to be legally liable, and finally it was only after extreme methods that I was able to get Jack Field to become chairman, but upon two conditions: he would take it only for two years, which was one half of a term, and we would not chair the meetings, I would have to chair them. So you had what was a very unhealthy arrangement of the person who was responsible to the Board, actually chairing the Board, which is not a desirable arrangement. It is a very lonely feeling to come back into this situation, and suddenly the Board chairman resigned.

The third thing I want to mention was that not only did the Board Chairman resign, but the vice president for finance had also, I think retired, not resigned.

Allen: Yes, he had retired.

Lee: However the position was not filled. And what happened at this point is very important historically. The Board had hired Peat Marwick as a search firm to find a financial vice president. When I arrived, the head of the Peat Marwick team, he was a very pompous guy, came to me and said they had discovered, they had found a man, the number one guy and they would send him to me. I said, no, no, you will not do that. You will send me the top four people. Not just the top man. I interviewed the top four people and they were really very decent, fine people. In any other situation, like Alfred, they would have been great. But this was not Alfred in 1955 or 70. This was UB in '74. And they were not anything like what we needed. They would have been cut to ribbons here. What I needed was a rather nasty person. I needed somebody with enormous physical physique, cause he has got to stay up late, I needed somebody with a lot of balls, if you
will pardon the expression, a lot of guts, wasn't worried about whether he was a diplomat, in fact he had to be virtually the reverse, he had to be somebody who had experience in massive layoffs. Who had been through it and knew how to do it. Because I didn't. And so I set out to find that person myself. I won't go into how I found that person, that is a longer story, but, through my own sources I finally found Harry Rowell, after a few false starts. And I will never forget the first interview with Rowell in the University club in New York. I had kept on my little recruiting team one of the Peat Marwick officials, because I was trying to keep their nose from getting too much out of joint. We paid them off, it was $14,000 bucks, paid them off. But I kept one of them on my team to give them a feeling that we were not rejecting them completely. The guy that I kept on that team, from Peat Marwick, made a complete pain of himself at every interview I conducted, he slouched down in his seat, completely uninterested, and pretended to be completely uninterested in what we were doing, and pretending to fall asleep and showing me what scorn he had for what was going on.

However, within five minutes after Harry Rowell began to talk, this guy was beginning to straighten up in his seat, after 10 minutes he was taking out a pad and starting to take notes. I never will forget it. And the reason was that that Harry Rowell was brilliant, Harry Rowell was somewhere close to a genius, and Harry Rowell had what I wanted, incredible gall, balls, enormous physical physique, and great experience at Carnegie-Mellon in laying off hundreds of people. And that was what I was looking for.

The question was how to get Harry past the search Committee. Because they had a search committee of faculty, and there was one thing Harry had no use for, it was faculty. You remember that story and can probably tell it better than I. The question was how the hell, can we get him by. I think that by that time you were my assistant, weren't you?

Allen: Unofficially. I was giving you reports on these people.

Lee: You can tell that story better than I do. But the point I wanted to make is that my administration will rightly be accused of making some bad decisions, I don't know any administration that wont. If there was one decision that was the right one, it was this one. Because I think, without my bringing Harry here, first of all Harry dug and found the problem, I don't think the other guys would have done that, and secondly, Harry had the guts to make the moves. We spent during the first six months almost every night in Waldemere up to ten o'clock at night, walking on the veranda, role playing, trying to get some way to breaking out of the incredible situation. Initially not being able to find a way. But I have the greatest admiration for Harry, and I think it needs to be known that he was brought, he would never
have been brought here, had we followed the advice of Peat Marwick. I am proud of that decision.

Two other final points. No I guess I've made, oh, no two other final points.

The budget was supposed to be balanced when I arrived. And Diem, in fact, had told me early on that things seemed to be under control. Not being highly skilled in finance, I didn't ask the right questions or dig deep enough and it never occurred to me that I wouldn't be told the truth. In retrospect, I think that the fact I wasn't told the truth was not in most cases malevolent, it was a case of simply incredible ignorance on the part of the Board itself. I think to a large extent people were not trying deliberately to deceive me, but simply didn't know. But for any reason, the budget was supposed to be balanced. In point of fact, we discovered in August, when I arrived, that it was one and a half million out of balance, that there was a cumulative deficit of a million, and in addition to that there was another incredible situation that I had never heard of in my experience, the Board had borrowed from its own current fund, three million dollars. It had simply taken the cash out of the current fund, which is what we refer to as the operating budget, and they had used that money to build buildings. Now in the balance sheet, since the buildings were built, they represented assets, so you had a liability here, where you had borrowed the money from the current fund, and you had an asset here in the buildings, so it balanced out in the P & L Statement, however, in terms of the current funds, this three million was listed as receivables. In other words, that you borrowed three million but you had three million receivables. There was no way you could get back three million receivables from capital projects. There was no way you could accomplish that. And the result was an incredible cash flow, created partly by the deficit and partly by this procedure. And the result was, as you know a severe fiscal crisis, exacerbated by two strikes. I think it is very difficult for anybody today to realize the emotional upheaval of those times, and the feelings of one caught in that swirl of emotions.

THE last thing -

Allen: Let me interrupt for just a moment, we are almost at the end of the tape,

END OF SIDE TWO.

TAPE SIDE THREE.

Allen: Alright this is side three of the interview with Dr. Leland Miles. OK, Lee, you have your last point.

Lee: Last point has to do with the Benton property. You will
recall that Senator Benton had left in his will, his very beautiful home and the eleven acre property on Long Island Sound, as a president's home. And one of the lures to get me here was that property and that home. I remember vividly being told by a trustee committee that since the home was really not that impressive internally, it was badly cut up, that they would be adding another $150,000.00 wing to that, that is literally exactly what was said to give Ginny and me entertainment space. When we got here, we discovered two things: first of all the cost of maintaining that property was, as I recall, $42,000.00, and that was in 1974, $42,000.00 a year, just to maintain the property, plus the fact, that by this time it was obvious that we would have to have massive layoffs. And how were we to live in the mansion while I had this responsibility of causing misery for other people, no way.

So that is the secret of how we built the Wheeler Recreational Center. People have often asked me, where did you get all that money from? Because the Wheeler Recreation Center was, I think, about a million dollars, or maybe a million and three hundred thousand, and we only raised, say about three hundred thousand, where did the rest of the money come from? Nobody has ever been told this, that the Wheeler Recreation Center wouldn't be here, if Ginny and I hadn't decided that we would sell that property. Because we felt ethically, we couldn't live there while we were performing the lay offs. Plus if we lived in it, we couldn't afford the maintenance costs.

So you have a situation, then, where there was no collective bargaining contract, where the Board Chairman resigned a week after arrival, where there was no financial Vice President, where it turned out there was a balanced budget in fact added up to a 5.5 million dollar problem, and where all the glamour of living on Southport, vanished overnight in what we were (?) to start with.

Allen: Fine, Lee. Although you asked me to keep this confidential, I have other sources for virtually everything that you have said.

Lee: Do you really? Does it tally with?

Allen: Oh, yes, yes.

Lee: My facts might be off a little bit, the memory is a tricky thing.

Allen: No, particularly on the summary, virtually everything I can verify either from other interviews or from my personal knowledge.

Lee: I did check, the only thing I did check, was the matter of the finances, because I looked back, on page two or three of the
first Long Range Plan, to check my data, I wanted to be sure that it was correct.

Allen: For the purposes of the interview, I am going to turn it off, but then I want to say a couple of things afterwards.

This is the end of this interview.
TO: Dr. Miles
FROM: W. F. Allen
SUBJECT: Questions for Taping Interview
DATE: 18 August 1986

In preparation for our taping session on your experiences as Dean of Arts and Science, I am forwarding, as you suggested, several questions so that you may jog your memory. Please understand that these basic questions may be expanded upon during the interview. You may also add anything which you may subsequently recall. (My questions usually center around Twenty Questions, literally.)

1. Why did you come to UB? (HWL Dec. Interview and spring contract.)

2. What was your charge upon becoming Dean of A&S? ("Commitment to Excellence"?)

3. How was this implemented? (Shakespeare Institute, Monograph Series, New Faculty, Graduate Studies?)

4. Problems with individual faculty, i.e. Parsons and McCallum charges; Collier and Dana Speech, "Fakes", etc.

5. How were you able to get assistant deans whereas Dr. Ropp had been unsuccessful? (Report to Planning Committee Jan. '66 re lack of administrative assistance and lack of Secretarial help.)

6. You said in the above report that the Council of Deans was archaic. Why? Examples?

7. In Aug. '65 Dr. Littlefield reported to the Board that he had had conferences with you and Dr. See on your hopes and aspirations after one year. What were they?

8. Were you able to make A&S "Central to the University"? How?

9. What was your role in the Senate reconsideration of General Education in the fall of '66?

10. What are your estimates on the effectiveness of the Senate? (Do not transfer your subsequent feelings retroactively.)

11. Were you aware of Board discussion of a "Massive Gift" in the Spring of '66?

12. Do you recall the Dean's Retreat (Atlantic City) in Apr. '67?
What was it and what was accomplished?

13. How did you promote Faculty and Student Communication? (Advisory Committees, Scholar’s dinners, etc.)

14. What were your relations with Dr. See?

15. What were your relations with Dr. Halsey?

16. What were you relations with Dr. Littlefield?

17. Were you an applicant for VPAA?

18. Aside from the opportunity to become President of Alfred, why did you leave UB?

19. What were your greatest successes as a Dean?

20. What were your greatest failures as a Dean?

There will be plenty of opportunity to make observations on many persons both administrative and faculty.
PAA Search Comm 31 Oct 1966
Marsillus wanted Engineer.

Comm discussed "in considerable detail the qualifications and administrative capabilities of Dean _____ of the University of pt." After review of fact as presented by HWL it was agreed to keep looking although this Dean's name was still kept on list.

Educational Policies Comm 7 Nov 66.
Last year refused to recognize the DuBois Club. This year The Society for Socialistic Studies" recognized.

Exec Comm 8 Nov 66