



Analytics to understand coups d'état occurrence in U.S.A.

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Abstract

My research question is why hasn't there been a coups d'état in the United States of America, USA? By analyzing a large dataset of 122 countries and over 2000 coups attempts, I try to understand analytically what can cause a coups d'état to occur in the USA. I combine the semi-parametric and extreme bounds data analysis techniques to effectively make a conclusion that democracy and GDP/capita play a big role in success or fail of a coups d'état and how this plays out for my research.

Introduction

Probably few people know about the only post-independence coups d'état reported in USA history, the morning of November 10th, 1898 in Wilmington, North Carolina. For all the strikes, violence, gangs' and cartels' gruesome attacks and a president's assassination; it is surprising, generally, that the North Carolina massacre is the only coups d'état reported to have occurred on USA soil. United States has zero coups attempt in the last 60 years compared to the rest of the world.

Preliminary research

Motivates and Justifies choice of data set

Global Economic index agencies, United Nations security agency reports, etc. report on global stability and the relationship to business environment for sustainable future. Coup d'état is frequently discussed especially when it comes to Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. I am highly interested in global investments and risk management. Stability is a key factor on the return of any investment. My choice of coup d'état data set is because it is collected over time and can be historically verified and linked to my research and most of the data is quantifiable by days to success or failure, fatality rate etc. key indicators of a coups d'état analysis are economic, political, military and social.

Exploratory results




Fig.1 coups attempts by region (1950-2010)

Exploratory results

A coups attempt is defined as successful if the coup master mind seize and hold power for at least seven days (Powell & Thyne 2011:252)




Fig.2 successful and unsuccessful coups (1950-2010)

Methodology

- I will apply the theories of determinants of coups and the predictive nature of coups from one time period to the next using the cox model
- I will use the semi-parametric analysis or the survival analysis which indicate the importance of time until the event's occurrence.
- I will apply the extreme bounds analysis of coups determinants(Becker's 1968)

($E(u)=(p \cdot B)+(1-p) \cdot C$) – the decision to stage a coup against the executive branch of government depends on whether the expected utility of doing so outweighs the level of utility of the status quo.

P the probability of successfully removing the executive from office
B payoff(benefit) for its perpetrators
C the negative payoff(cost) in case the coup fails

- Possible problem- Some plausible determinants of coups are related to more than one side of the equation, bias towards political power.
- Solution-I perform a sensitivity analysis

The variables of the models under sensitivity analysis

- Political regime-** with a range from -9 to 9 denoting a situation of full autocracy and 9 describing democratic regime.
- Political right** – captures the status of democracy and freedom in the country
- Coup trap-** capture the importance of the present regimes durability of its political survival
- Ethnic war-** obtained from the state failure problem set on internal wars and governments.

Methodology

- Alliance-** information derived from War formal alliance dataset
- Foreign policy-** how countries becomes vulnerable when it decides to engage in a conflict against one or multiple parties or when facing foreign policy
- GDP/Capita-** to see who controls the economy of the country
- Military expenditure/GDP-** represents for some governments the bulk of their budget.

Results

	Conditional Cox regression model with elapsed time approach (Model 1)	Conditional Cox regression model with gap time approach (Model 2)
Political regime	-0.849*** (0.234)	-0.838*** (0.228)
Coup trap	0.506*** (0.167)	0.427 (0.512)
Ethnic war	0.107 (0.245)	0.358* (0.223)
Alliance	0.475** (0.190)	0.470** (0.187)
L(Military expenditures/GDP)	-0.115** (0.048)	-0.118** (0.049)
L(GDP/capita)	-0.333*** (0.068)	-0.317*** (0.065)
Foreign policy crisis	0.423 (0.262)	0.365 (0.269)

Fig.3 regression estimates using the survival model.

*p<0.10 ; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (2-tailed); standard errors are in parenthesis.




Fig.4 shows the political survival after occurrence of a coup

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
Political regime	-0.05	0.78	1.00	0.37
Coup trap	-0.01	0.03	1.00	0.85
Ethnic war	-0.04	0.01	1.00	0.92
Alliance	-0.00	0.00	1.00	0.99
L(Military expenditures/GDP)	-0.12	5.35	1.00	0.02
L(GDP/capita)	0.15	3.61	1.00	0.05
Foreign policy crisis	0.01	0.11	1.00	0.74
Global test		10.07	7.00	0.18

Fig.5 shows the sensitivity analysis of the model's proportionality

Conclusion

- A coup is less likely to be perpetrated in a democratic country like USA.
- Countries with alliances expose themselves to risk of coup
- GDP/capita and high military spending reduce the risk of a coup.

All the above results show that USA is unlikely to experience a coup in the near future. However, the question is, will this stability only last as long as the economy and the military might still stand strong?

References

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